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Essentially, it is impossible to determine when small-
pox first infected humans, but evidence suggests that
it may have first appeared during the Neolithic Age.
The mummified remains of Egyptians, specifically
Pharaoh Ramses V (d. 1157BC), provide the first
credible evidence of smallpox infection. By the 6th
century AD smallpox was firmly rooted in Asia. The
Crusades and expanding trade with Asia spread the
disease into Europe. From there, the Europeans car-
ried the disease to the NewWorld and by themid 18th
century, the disease was endemic virtually every-
where in the world with the exception of Australia.
The first smallpox vaccine was developed by Jen-
ner in the late 18th century. Noticing that milkmaids
who contracted cowpox (a close relative to smallpox)
developed an immunity to the disease, he used the
pus from cowpox lesions to create the vaccine.
Approximately a century and a half later, the World
Health Organization (WHO) initiated a worldwide
vaccination program. The program was successful
and the last reported naturally occurring case of
smallpox was in 1977. WHO officially declared the
disease eradicated in 1980. Currently, there are only
two official repositories of the virus — one at the
Centers for DiseaseControl andPrevention in Atlanta,
Georgia and the other at Russian State Research
Center of Virology and Biotechnology in Koltsovo.
Variola virus belongs to the family Poxviridae,
subfamily Chordopoxvirinae, and genus Orthopox-
virus, which includes vaccinia, monkeypox virus,1201-9712/$30.00 # 2004 International Society for Infectious Diseas
doi:10.1016/j.ijid.2004.09.004and several other animal poxviruses that cross react
serologically.1
Smallpox affects people of all ages but has the
highest mortality rates among the young and the
elderly. Transmission primarily occurs via the
respiratory route (from nose and mouth secretions)
and infection can occur with as little as ten viral
particles.2,3 The mortality rate of naturally occur-
ring cases in untreated individuals is between 20%
and 50%. Death usually results from viremia, tox-
emia, disseminated intravascular coagulation,
hypotension, or cardiovascular collapse.
There are three phases of clinical manifestation of
traditional smallpox infection: incubation, which
usually lasts between 7 and 14 days (with a range
of 4 to 19 days), prodrome, and pox. The prodromal
period is characterized by a high fever (38.5 8C to
40.5 8C)andother symptoms includingmalaise, head-
ache, and backache. The period of manifestation
begins when small red lesions appear on the patient’s
tongue and palate. The telltale rash appears during
the final phase, the manifestation period. During this
phase, the rash first appears in the form of macules
that progress to papules, then to vesicles, which turn
into scabs that gradually fall off leaving unpigmented
marks. Indivduals are contagious until all of the scabs
have fallen off. The differential diagnosis includes
monkeypox and chickenpox. Distinguishable features
ofa smallpox rashare thatofacentrifugaldistribution
of lesions that tend to appear monomorphic (all one
stage) and are deep-seated, firm to the touch, round
with common appearance on the soles of the feetes. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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commonbutmore severe formsof smallpox infection,
the flat and hemorrhagic forms. There is no specific
treatment for smallpox disease, and the only preven-
tion is vaccination.Smallpox as a Bioweapon
History of smallpox as a weapon
Smallpox has been used as a weapon for longer than
one may realize. As early as the 14th century, Tartar
forces catapulted the corpses of smallpox victims
into besieged towns to weaken and destroy
entrapped defenders. This may have been the first,
but was by no means the last, example of biological
warfare in which a biological material was used to
injure and/or kill a large portion of the population.4
Smallpox was also used as a biological weapon
during the French and Indian Wars (1754—1767) by
the commander of Fort Pitt. Soldiers distributed
blankets that had been used by smallpox patients
with the intent of initiating outbreaks among Amer-
ican Indians. An epidemic occurred, killing more
than 50% of infected tribes.5,6
History of production of smallpox
biological weapons
Most biodefense experts believe that it would be
difficult to manufacture large quantities of the
smallpox virus, but evidence to the contrary exists.
While several countries are suspected of developing
a smallpox weapon, there is conclusive evidence
that the former Soviet Union produced smallpox
weapons in large quantities.
During the late 1930s the Soviet Union first
attempted to cultivate the smallpox virus by grow-
ing it on the chorioallantoic membrane of develop-
ing chicken embryos. The Soviet Union used the
chicken embryo technique almost exclusively for
over three decades (from the 1940s through the
1960s), during which time it was modified somewhat
to accommodate mechanization and automation,
thereby becoming more efficient and productive.
Extensive manpower and substantial material
requirements, however, limited the production
capacity of the chicken embryo technique. During
the late 1960s and early 1970s, in order to increase
production capacities, Soviet scientists began
experimenting with reactor cultivation using 10,
25, 100, 250, and 630 liter reactors. However,
numerous difficulties prevented this technique from
fully replacing older techniques until the late 1980s.
These difficulties included: Varying chemical compositions of the distilled and
de-ionized water used to prepare nutrient media
for the cultivation of continuous cell culture A lack of standardization among nutrient media
imported from various suppliers (concentration
and ratio of amino acids, standardization and
sterilization of serum used as the source of neces-
sary growth factors) Difficulty in obtaining a standard concentration of
tissue culture, often the result of contamination
or the above-mentioned variations in water and
nutrient media High frequency of tissue and viral culture con-
tamination High concentration of virus needed for manufac-
turing an effective biological weapon.However, by the end of the 1980s most of these
issues were resolved and a new reactor-based small-
pox biological weapon in liquid form was developed.
Although research has shown that it is possible
to obtain both dry and liquid forms of a smallpox
weapon, the Soviet Union never manufactured
a dry formulation of smallpox because of the sta-
bility and viability of the liquid smallpox weapon.
In a deep frozen state, liquid smallpox remains
stable for years and viable for months at 0—4 8C.
Additionally, liquid smallpox formulation is stable
in an aerosol. Unlike liquid smallpox, the pro-
duction of dry smallpox presented the danger
of the virus escaping during the manufacturing
process.
Testing the smallpox biological weapon and
its potential effectiveness
Prior to the late 1970s, field testing of smallpox
biological weapons in the Soviet Union was conduc-
ted at Vozrozhdenie Island. Field testing was halted
in the late 1970s because of the potential of creating
an epidemic after naturally occurring smallpox had
been eradicated and the Soviet Union had signed the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
Though field testing of the smallpox weapon was
halted, other forms of testing continued. In the late
1980s, new variants of the smallpox weapon (those
produced using large-scale fermentation in 250 L
or 630 L reactors) were tested using exploding
micromodels of bomblets loaded with smallpox for-
mulation in small chambers. Using mathematical
modeling, the results were then extrapolated to
determine the effects that would be seen if used
as a full-scale weapon. In December of 1990, testing
of the new large-scale reactor formulation was
completed and all necessary calculations to deter-
mine a possible effectiveness of a new smallpox
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be accepted in armament.
Since smallpox biological weapons have never
been used on a large scale, such as that envisioned
by the Soviets, no data were available on the actual
danger and expected losses encountered with these
weapons. However, using what was known about
smallpox, it was possible to estimate the potential
damage. Drawing from the knowledge of smallpox as
a disease, Soviet experts concluded that the effec-
tiveness of smallpox biological weapons would
depend on the following characteristics: The infectious dose (the infectious dose of small-
pox is very low: the LD50 is only 10—20 viral
particles) Its stability in an aerosol and its ability to travel
for many miles without the loss of virulence (the
liquid formulation of smallpox is stable in an
aerosol and remains viable for many miles) Its ability to survive in the environment for days or
even for weeks (smallpox is capable of this) The number of vaccinated civilians or troops (vac-
cination is no longer required for these groups) Its index of contagiousness (the index of contigu-
ousness for smallpox is from 0.6 to 0.9 [number of
diseased/number of contacts]) The length of the incubation period (the incuba-
tion period for smallpox is relatively short: 7—17
days; the use of smallpox in a weaponized aerosol
form will likely shorten this period and the first
cases can be expected to appear by day 3 or 4
after infection) The length of time people remain infectious (peo-
ple infected with smallpox could already be con-
tagious in the prodromal period, before they have
specific signs of disease, and remain contagious
throughout the course of the disease) The length of time corpses remain infectious
(though irrelevant under regular circumstances,
the event of a massive aerosol attack with high
number of casualties, corpses of smallpox fatal-
ities will remain infectious for a long time - days to
months, depending primarily on environmental
temperature) The severity of the clinical picture (with smallpox
infection, the clinical picture is extremely severe
in many cases) The complexity and severity of the treatment
regimen (the treatment regimen for smallpox is
complex and the duration of the disease is long,
requiring efforts of a large number of medical and
support personnel).All of these characteristics led Soviet experts to
believe that there was no biological weapon com-parable to smallpox and it was included on a short
list of strategic biological weapons.
However, times have changed and the Soviet
Union no longer exists. Russia does not present
the same threat of biological weapons as the Soviet
Union did. At the same time, we cannot say that
smallpox is gone for good and that there is no danger
of a smallpox release in the future. In the past, the
threat of smallpox being used as a weapon was a
military one; today it is a bioterrorist threat.Potential methods of release and
consequences of smallpox attack
A biological attack using smallpox could be con-
ducted in several ways: By contamination of various articles and food
 Using an intentionally infected terrorist
 Using mechanical devices to generate an aerosol
in the open air or an enclosed space Using explosive devices
 Using ‘‘natural’’ air movements (subway, elevator
silos, etc.) to generate an aerosol from dry pow-
ders or by evaporation from liquid formulations.Regardless of the release method, the number of
people who are infected or are suspected of being
infected will be significant. However, the actual
number of casualties would be difficult to determine
as it would depend on numerous factors including: The actual virulence of the strain used
 The concentration of the pathogen in the formu-
lation Meteorological conditions
 Terrain characteristics
 The number of people outside vs. inside buildings
 The nature and capacity of building ventilation
systems Transportation (e.g., presence vs. absence of sub-
way system).Even in the case of a relatively small amount
released, initially there could be hundreds or even
thousands of casualties.
Victims would need to be isolated and treated as
soon as possible after exposure. However, the large
number of patients would make it impossible to
successfully treat them all; existing medical and
support personnel, medications, and medical equip-
ment would not be sufficient. Depending on the size
of the aerosol attack, the number of casualties may
initially vary from a relatively small number to many
thousands.
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direct its course: secondary droplet infections,
which are caused by the virus being excreted into
bodily fluids and then aerosolized (by a cough or a
sneeze, for example), and secondary non-aerosol
infections, which in the case of smallpox would
primarily be caused by contact with live virus on
contaminated surfaces and in human cadavers. With
smallpox, secondary droplet infections would be of
great significance because of smallpox’s high degree
of contagiousness. Although smallpox is not as con-
tagious as other diseases that are nearly absolutely
contagious such as influenza and measles, a very
significant number of people would become secon-
darily infected.
Thus, with the smallpox biological weapon the
number of casualties would differ considerably from
that seen with the use of a non-contagious biological
agent such as anthrax. For a non-contagious agent,
the number of new cases would build up to a peak
and then taper off almost entirely by the end of the
incubation period. Just a relatively small number of
new cases might appear after the incubation period
as the result of secondary aerosolization of the
original agent and possible non-aerosol secondary
infections. But with smallpox, the number of new
cases would build up to a peak by the 4th or 17th day
after deployment and then form a plateau. A new
peak formed by secondary cases would appear and
would then be followed by a new plateau, etc. The
duration of these plateaus and peaks would depend
on the intensity of the secondary infections, pri-
marily the secondary droplet infections.
Eventually, as the result of vigorous anti-epi-
demic measures, the number of cases would slowly
diminish. The length of time that this would take
depends on: The number of people affected by the primary
aerosols Transportation of people from the site of the
original attack in the first hours and days after
the attack as they can form new epidemic foci The effectiveness of quarantine, isolation, disin-
fection, and cadaver disposal measures The intensity and effectiveness of treatment and
emergency prophylactic (vaccination) measures.However, a smallpox biological weapons attack
would have ramifications other than just human
casualties. Use of a smallpox biological weapon
would also result in: A complete or partial disruption of vital (including
business, travel, production, tourism and others)
activity for a relatively long period of time An extreme shortage of medical and auxiliary
personnel to stop the epidemic and reduce its
consequences A lack of adequate pharmaceutical and medical
preparations for treatment and emergency pro-
phylaxis An extreme panic leading to the disruption of
normal life activities and frequent incidents of
violence, especially amongst those desiring to be
vaccinated against the disease.
It is unlikely that a smallpox attack would result
in a super-catastrophic event with the loss of many
millions of lives. Underestimating the possible con-
sequences of an attack, however, would be a dan-
gerous and costly mistake. A bioterrorist attack
using smallpox formulations in any form will result
in tremendous cost in terms of loss of life and
psychological and economic damage to the country
in which the attack occurs.
If an attack occurs in the near future, it is unlikely
that a genetically modified strain of variola would be
used. However, if the strain is geneticallymodified to
increase its virulence, possible consequences could
be even more dramatic. Unfortunately, scientific
advancements over the last two decades have made
it possible to develop genetically altered strains of
orthopoxviruses.Creation of genetically engineered
orthopoxviruses may result in new
smallpox weapons
Genetic engineering of viruses has become a com-
mon practice. One major objective of genetic
manipulation is to use engineered viral vectors for
the delivery of genetic information with therapeutic
intent or to modify viruses so as to alter the host’s
immune response. Changes in virulence and host
range of modified viruses are generally hard to
predict. However, when one studies the possibility
of making variola virus more pathogenic, the
research and development work will most likely
be focused on the following ‘‘targets’’: Shortening the incubation period of the disease by
improving the attachment of the virus to a host
cell and accelerating virus propagation in host
cells Reducing the infectious dose and increasing
mortality by the suppression/subversion of innate
and specific immune responses to the virus Strengthening the severity, ‘‘adding’’ new syn-
dromes of infection and increasing mortality
by widening the number of potential sites of
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etc.).These are just some of the possible targets of
genetic engineering procedures. However, even if
suchwork is underway in some countries, it is obvious
that we would never obtain any ‘‘official’’ informa-
tion on the work with variola virus to increase its
virulence by inserting alien genes. At the same time,
weneed to knowwhat andhow this genetic engineer-
ing work could be performed in order to understand
what protection wemust develop against genetically
engineered variola virus. Several publications have
already demonstrated what directions could be
employed to develop recombinant variola virus.
Orthopoxvirus is known to have a large capacity
to accommodate foreign DNA. The genetic informa-
tion of variola major is contained in double-stranded
DNA with a size of about 180 kbp that codes about
150—200 polypeptides. In 1993, a group of Russian
authors published anarticle regarding thecreationof
a recombinant vaccinia virus with an inserted DNA
copy of the 26S RNA of Venezuelan equine encepha-
lomyelitis (VEE)virus.7 Inordertocreaterecombinant
variants of variola major virus, scientists inserted
alien DNA into an ‘‘insignificant’’ area of the thymi-
dine kinase gene (located in the centralHindIII region
ofthevirusgenome-L2RofvariolamajorvirusandJ2R
of vaccinia virus). However, possible weaknesses of
this method include the need to inactivate the L2R
gene (thymidine kinase) and to use special TK cell
lines and a mutagenic selecting agent (like BUdR, for
example). The process of creating the combined
vaccinia-VEE virus was conducted as follows: A full DNA copy of the subgenomic RNA 26S of VEE
virus ‘‘Trinidad’’ was assembled from overlapping
fragments The resultant sequence was inserted into the
vaccinia virus thymidine kinase gene in a pXJP
plasmid under control of the gene promoter P7.5 The resultant recombinant plasmid was inte-
grated by homologous recombination into the
genome (gene of thymidine kinase) of vaccinia
virus.However, the first successful attempts to con-
struct genetically engineered poxviruses took place
in the beginning of the 1980s8 when recombinant
vaccinia viruses containing the cloned hemaggluti-
nin gene from influenza virus were constructed. In
1988, a recombinant vaccinia virus expressing VEE
virus’s capsid protein and glycoprotein E1 and E2
was created.9 Even though these experiments (and
many others at that time) were performed under
legitimate research and development projects, theyprovide a general understanding that genetic
manipulations with orthopoxviruses are possible
and have a high rate of success.
Soviet scientists made a considerable effort to
study the molecular biology of orthopoxviruses and
published articles, including those describing genes
necessary for overcoming the host protective
mechanisms.10 When such work started in the Soviet
Union, there were two major goals. The first goal
was to develop new methods of creating genetically
engineered orthopoxviruses without losing any bio-
logical functions. The second was to develop a new
vector for creating new vaccines (providing a legit-
imate reason for this type of research). It would be
incorrect to say all of this work was part of the
offensive weapons program since some projects
were intended to develop legitimate preparations.
Clear examples were the projects conducted to
create recombinant vaccinia virus with an inserted
DNA copy of the RNA of the Ebola virus VP24 gene11
and the creation of recombinant vaccinia virus
expressing Japanese encephalitis virus protein.12
According to these publications, the recombinant
vaccinia virus with these inserted alien genes was
stable in cultivation and possessed some specific
immunological activity. However, at the same time
it was shown that not every genetic manipulation
with the orthopoxvirus genome would result in the
development of ‘‘effective’’ genetically modified
strains.13 Two integrative plasmids with the expres-
sive marker gene for beta-galactosidase were con-
structed for insertional inactivation of nonessential
genes E7R and D8L of vaccinia virus located in the
central region of the viral genome. Inactivation of
the D8L gene in the strains WR and LIVP resulted in
smaller viral plaques in the culture of chicken
embryo cells and, decreased the virus’s ability to
propagate in mouse brain, even though it had no
effect on the size and character of damage in
intracutaneous infection of rabbits). Inactivation
of the E7R gene did not affect the known biological
properties of the virus. This, and other work, cre-
ated concern among Soviet scientists that inacti-
vation of some (even nonessential) genes could
result in viral attenuation. Since there was concern
that if alien genes are built into important regions of
the variola genome (e.g., the thymidine kinase
gene), the virulence of the virus may be affected.
This makes it difficult to evaluate the biological
influence of an insertion on the pathogenesis of
the viral infection. Therefore, the Russian scientists
conducted research and development work to
locate regions of the viral DNA in which insertion
of alien genes would not disrupt functionally impor-
tant sequences of the genome.14 It was shown
that the insertion of foreign genes into the space
S8 K. Alibekbetween genes (immediately following the thymi-
dine kinase gene) did not affect the virulence of the
orthopoxvirus. This research helped to increase the
understanding of the theoretical possibilities of
developing genetically engineered orthopoxviruses
without losing their other biological properties.
The discovery of one possible way to genetically
engineer orthopoxviruses occurred just recently.15
The gene of mouse type interleukin-4 was inserted
into the genome of mousepox virus and was expres-
sed during infection. It was shown that expression of
interleukin-4 by a thymidine kinase-positive ectro-
melia virus suppressed cytolytic responses of NK and
CTL and the expression of interferon-gamma by the
latter. Genetically resistant mice infected with the
interleukin-4-expressing virus developed symptoms
of acute mousepox accompanied by high mortality.
Moreover, infection of recently immunized geneti-
cally resistant mice with the virus expressing IL-4
also resulted in significant mortality due to fulmi-
nant mousepox.
All of these studies demonstrate that the Rubicon
has already been crossed and the process of creating
novel genetically engineered orthopoxviruses is
irrevocable. It is just a matter of time before this
knowledge will result in the creation of super-killer
poxviruses.Conclusions and recommendations
Summarizing the above cited information, it is
obvious that the reemergence of smallpox as the
result of a manmade epidemic presents a grave
danger to mankind, although it would not annihilate
the entire human population from Earth. Most bio-
defense experts consider a smallpox terrorist attack
an unlikely event. While it is our hope that this is
true, there is evidence to the contrary. If a threat,
no matter how small, of a smallpox attack exists, it
must be addressed. The only way to truly reduce the
threat of a smallpox bioterrorist attack is to be
prepared for one. Anti-epidemic and therapeutic
measures such as effective detection systems, quar-
antine and isolation procedures, vaccine prophy-
laxis, and appropriate therapies for early and late
stage infections must be developed. Only then
would we be assured of our ability to meet this
threat fully armed. The alternative is to remain
as helpless as the millions of people who died of
smallpox over previous centuries.Acknowledgements
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